

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 AMMAN 06188 01 OF 02 290925Z  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
-----016777 290928Z /13/10

P 261039Z JUL 78  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6999  
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 06188

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT PARAS 4, 5 AND 6)

E. O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PEPR, JO, EG, XF  
SUBJECT: KING HUSSEIN ON SADAT AND ARAB/ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY

1. AT PRIVATE LUNCHEON GIVEN BY KING HUSSEIN AND QUEENNOOR FOR AMBASSADOR AND MRS. ATHERTON AND CHARGE AND MRS. SUDDARTH ON JULY 25, KING HUSSEIN MADE POINT OF ASKING ATHERTON WHETHER U. S. ATTRIBUTED ANY SIGNIFICANCE TO REPORTS THAT SADAT HAS MENTIONED THAT OCTOBER 1978 WILL BE A DECISIVE DATE IF THERE IS NO PROGRESS IN THE MIDEAST NEGOTIATIONS. KING SAID HE HAS HEARD SADAT HAS ALLUDED TO THIS DATE IN SEVERAL RECENT CONVERSATIONS. ONE PERSON HAD TOLD KING THAT SADAT HAD SAID AMONG HIS OPTIONS WAS MILITARY ACTION TO OCCUPY SINAI DEMILITARIZED ZONE IN OCTOBER. KING SAID THIS FRIGHTENED HIM. (KING'S UNDERLYING DISTRUST OF SADAT CAME THROUGH IN THIS AND OTHER COMMENTS.)

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2. KING SAID EGYPT HAS A HISTORY OF TAKING PRECIPITATE ACTIONS WITHOUT CONSULTING WITH ARAB STATES AND HE IS THEREFORE CONCERNED OVER SUCH REPORTS, HOWEVER UNSUBSTANTIATED, SINCE SUCH A PLAN COULD PROVOKE A MILITARY CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAEL, WITH SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ENTIRE REGION, WHICH KING BELIEVES SHOULD BE AVOIDED AT

ALL COSTS.

3. IN REPLY, AMBASSADOR ATHERTON SAID THAT SADAT IN HIS SEPTEMBER 1975 PRESS CONFERENCE ON CONCLUSION OF SINAI II AGREEMENT MENTIONED THREE YEAR PERIOD HE WAS GIVING TO WORK FOR PEACE. ATHERTON SAID THAT ON NUMBER OF OCCASIONS SINCE THEN, OCTOBER 1978 HAS BEEN MENTIONED BY SADAT FROM TIME TO TIME AS A BENCHMARK. ATHERTON WAS NOT AWARE OF WHAT PRECISELY SADAT HAS IN MIND BUT HE HAD NOT ALLUDED TO MILITARY ACTION AS POSSIBLE OPTION TO US. ATHERTON THOUGHT IT MORE LIKELY THAT SADAT WOULD CONSIDER A STEP SUCH AS NON-RENEWAL OF UNEF MANDATE, WHICH IS DUE IN OCTOBER, AND RETURN TO COORDINATED ARAB APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS VIA GENEVA. WE DID NOT HAVE CLEAR IDEA OF WHAT SADAT FELT HE NEEDED TO GET PAST HIS OCTOBER "DEADLINE" BUT WOULD OF COURSE ENCOURAGE HIM TO TAKE NO PRECIPITATE ACTION.

4. DURING LUNCHEON ALSO KING HUSSEIN TOSSED OUT IDEA HE HAS UNDER CONSIDERATION IN CONNECTION WITH HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO IRAN. KING IS THINKING OF AN APPEAL BY JORDAN FOR SOLIDARITY BETWEEN KEY ARAB STATES AND CERTAIN KEY NON-ARAB ISLAMIC STATES, SUCH AS IRAN, TURKEY, AND PAKISTAN. OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO ENLIST SUPPORT OF SOME ISLAMIC STATES IN CAMPAIGN TO KEEP DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE ON ISRAEL FOR A MORE FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE IN NEGOTIATIONS, INCLUDING QUESTION OF JERUSALEM, WHICH IS IMPORTANT FOR ALL ISLAMIC  
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STATES. KING THOUGHT SUCH EFFORTS MIGHT EVEN BE HELPFUL TO U. S. ATTEMPTS TO ADVANCE NEGOTIATIONS.

5. KING THOUGHT SUCH AN APPROACH MIGHT APPEAL TO THESE ARAB AND ISLAMIC STATES, SINCE THEY ARE ALL FACING INDIVIDUAL PROBLEMS MORE OR LESS IN ISOLATION; KING CITED IRAN'S INTERNAL PROBLEM, PAKISTAN'S CONCERN OVER LEFTIST TENDENCIES IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAROCHIALISM OF ARAB GULF STATES DESPITE THEIR NEED FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY.

6. IN REPLY, AMBASSADOR ATHERTON EMPHASIZED THAT HE VERY MUCH HOPED THAT THIS EFFORT WOULD NOT HAVE THE EFFECT OF HAMPERING THE PEACE EFFORTS OF SADAT AND THE PROCESS WHICH THE U. S. IS WORKING TO KEEP GOING. IN THIS CONNECTION, AMBASSADOR ATHERTON ADDED THAT U. S. BELIEVES IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO CONTINUE IF THE PEACE PROCESS IS TO CONTINUE AND THAT HE HOPED THIS CONCEPT WOULD NOT BE ATTACKED BY ANY GROUPING THAT KING IS CONTEMPLATING. ATHERTON ALSO COMMENTED THAT FOR MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS SUCH AN EFFORT SHOULD START WITH THE NUCLEUS OF A FEW LIKE-MINDED STATES AND SHOULD NOT APPEAR TO BE PROMPTED BY EITHER SUPER POWER.

7. COMMENT: GIVEN PAST HISTORY, KING HUSSEIN IS UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE TO SPECULATION THAT EGYPT MAY BE CONTEMPLATING SOME IMPORTANT UNILATERAL ACTION AND HIS REACTION TO STORY OF POSSIBLE SADAT OCTOBER DEADLINE MAY BE PARTLY INTENDED TO BUILD UP SOME DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE ON SADAT FOR RESTRAINT. IT ALSO ILLUSTRATES KING'S CONCERN THAT PEACE EFFORT IS LOSING MOMENTUM AND THAT AREA STABILITY COULD DETERIORATE

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
-----065191 261537Z /46

P 261039Z JUL 78  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0000  
INFO; RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 5118  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

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EXDIS

RAPIDLY IF MOMENTUM IS LOST. KING'S PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ABOUT COOPERATION BETWEEN KEY ISLAMIC AND ARAB STATES ALSO ILLUSTRATES KING'S DESIRE TO PLAY A BROADER ROLE IN AREA, AND TO FIND NEW WAYS OF MAINTAINING AREA STABILITY AND CONTINUING PRESSURE FOR MEANINGFUL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AS A CONTINGENCY AGAINST POSSIBLE LOSS OF MOMENTUM BY CURRENT PEACE PROCESS IN COMING MONTHS. SUDDARTH

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## Message Attributes

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**Draft Date:** 26 jul 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
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